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overnment involvement in loan markets in the United States is sub-
stantial. For example, federal government direct and assisted lending
for 1980 through 1987 amounted to $1208.1 billion, or 25.3 per-
cent of total net lending in nonﬁnancial credit markets over the period (Gale
1991). Only $115.5 billion of this amount represents direct federal lending;
the rest is accounted for by guaranteed loans ($251.3 billion), lending through
government-sponsored enterprises ($441.8 billion), and lending subsidized by
tax-exemptions ($399.5 billion). Can such interventions be justiﬁed as welfare-
improving corrections of market failures?
Some economists have argued that market failure is particularly likely in
credit markets because of “adverse selection”—borrowers have unveriﬁable
hidden knowledge about their likelihood of repayment.1 There is a type of
externality in loan offers, and this can sharply constrain loan market outcomes.
The author thanks Tom Humphrey, John Weinberg, Tony Kuprianov, and Tim Cook for
helpful comments on earlier drafts. Some of the material in this article resulted from joint
work with John Weinberg. The author is solely responsible for the contents of the article,
and the views expressed do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 “The Federal government has played a central role in the allocation of credit among compet-
ing uses. This paper illustrates that this sort of government program can under plausible conditions
improve on the unfettered market allocation. A necessary condition for efﬁcient government in-
tervention is unobservable heterogeneity among would-be borrowers regarding the probability of
default. The greater is such heterogeneity, the greater is the potential for default” (Mankiw [1986],
p. 469). See also de Meza and Webb (1987), Gale (1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), Innes
(1991), and Smith and Stutzer (1989).
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For example, a good borrower may not receive ideal loan terms, since an
otherwise indistinguishable bad borrower would have an incentive to apply for
that loan as well, making it unproﬁtable. The market failure literature argues
that government credit guarantees can ease these constraints by improving loan
terms for less creditworthy borrowers. The resulting improvement in loan terms
for good borrowers leaves them willing to fund the subsidy to bad borrowers.
In a separate literature, some economists have argued that adverse selection
can help explain the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries.2 In their models, ﬁnancial
intermediaries often emerge endogenously as part of equilibrium arrangements,
attaining allocations that cannot be attained through direct lending alone. One
notable result from these models is that the resulting ﬁnancial arrangement
cannot be improved upon by government intervention; private ﬁnancial ar-
rangements do as well as any government scheme.
How can we reconcile these two contrasting approaches? As I show in this
article, both are based on virtually identical economic environments. They dif-
fer, however, in how they predict outcomes for given economic environments;
each adopts a different deﬁnition of equilibrium. In the models rationalizing
government intervention, equilibrium is deﬁned by the way agents play a spe-
ciﬁc multi-stage game. The rules of the game have strong implications for
how agents rationally play and what outcome emerges. In contrast, models
of ﬁnancial intermediation are careful not to impose any institutional arrange-
ment on the agents in the economy, so that institutional structure can emerge
endogenously.
I argue in this article that the different deﬁnitions of equilibrium yield
contrasting policy conclusions because the market failure approach imposes
ad hoc restrictions that prevent mutually beneﬁcial contractual arrangements.
In the models of market failure, a seemingly reasonable implication of the
game agents play is that each type of loan contract must break even. This
condition prevents lenders from offering a menu of contracts that breaks even
on average but involves cross-subsidies across contracts. In this case, govern-
ment tax and subsidy schemes, such as credit guarantees, can bring about the
cross-subsidization that private agents cannot. Thus government intervention
can make all people better off, even though the government is subject to the
same informational constraints as private agents.
The same equilibrium condition rules out endogenous ﬁnancial interme-
diaries in the market failure models. Intermediaries arise in adverse selection
environments to reap the beneﬁts of cross-subsidy; by subsidizing one borrower
the incentive constraints impeding a better borrower can be relaxed, making
both types better off. Since ﬁnancial intermediaries are a prominent feature
2 See Miyazaki (1977), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Boyd, Prescott, and Smith (1988), and
Lacker and Weinberg (1993).       
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of loan markets, it seems desirable to adopt a model that allows ﬁnancial
intermediaries to emerge when they have a role to play. This suggests that the
adverse selection justiﬁcation for government intervention in loan markets is
based on an overly restrictive deﬁnition of equilibrium. I conclude that based
on the models now available, adverse selection does not justify government
intervention in loan markets.
In this article I focus solely on situations of adverse selection, in which
agents have relevant private information ex ante, that is, before they ﬁrst meet.
Situations of ex post private information, in which agents obtain hidden infor-
mation after they ﬁrst meet, do not present the same possibilities for market
failure. It is well known that the standard theorems on the optimality of com-
petitive equilibria continue to hold under ex post private information (Prescott
and Townsend 1984). As a consequence, adverse selection has received far
more attention as a potential source of market failure. There remain, of course,
possible justiﬁcations on redistributive grounds, but these are beyond the scope
of this article.3
1. AN ADVERSE SELECTION CREDIT ECONOMY
In this section I describe a simple economic environment with borrowing and
lending under adverse selection. The central feature of the environment is that
borrowers have private information about the risk and return on their investment
projects. Lenders do not know as much as borrowers, but try to infer as much
as they can from the repayment promises borrowers issue. Lenders’ beliefs and
borrowers’ actions are linked in a delicate interdependence that is the hallmark
of adverse selection environments. In order to make this interdependence man-
ageable and understandable, I will work with a drastically simpliﬁed economy.
Various versions of adverse selection credit economies have been studied by
economists. However, there is a basic structure shared by virtually all adverse
selection environments, and my argument carries over to more general settings.
The economy I examine contains one feature that is not standard in adverse
selection credit market models. I assume that borrowers are able to costlessly
hide the return to their project. This feature, along with the properties of the
collateral good, implies that borrowers’ repayment promises must take the form
of collateralized debt, as I showed in an earlier paper (Lacker 1991). In most
of the literature on adverse selection in credit markets, either debt contracts are
3 Some government credit programs might be justiﬁed to ameliorate the effects of other gov-
ernment regulations that inhibit diversiﬁcation by private ﬁnancial intermediaries, such as legal
restrictions on bank branching (Williamson 1993). The best solution, however, is to eliminate
the legal restrictions themselves. Lang and Nakamura (1993) argue that lending can generate an
informational externality via publicly disclosed appraisals.         
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imposed by the theorist or the equilibrium contracts are not debt at all.4 This
feature does not alter my argument in any way, but it makes the predicted ﬁnan-
cial arrangements somewhat more realistic and demonstrates that the argument
does not depend on the ad hoc imposition of debt contracts.
To begin then, there are two periods and all consumption takes place in
the second period. There are a large number of borrowers, each with a single
investment project that requires exactly one unit of input in the ﬁrst period and
yields a random return in the second period. The return can take on one of two
values: either R units of output (the “good state”) or zero (the “bad state”).
Borrowers’ returns are independent of one another. In addition, each borrower
has an amount K of a collateral good in the second period. This good is more
valuable to the borrower than it is to any other agent. One interpretation of
the collateral good is chattels—portable personal property such as clothing or
furniture.
Borrowers are risk-averse. They have identical utility functions over
second-period consumption, given by u(c1 + c2), where c1 is second-period
consumption of output and c2 is consumption of the collateral good. I assume
that the function u is strictly concave.
There are two types of borrowers—good and bad. The good borrowers
have a high probability of a good return, pg, and the bad borrowers have a low
probability of a good return, pb. I assume 0 < pb < pg < 1. A borrower’s type
is known only to that borrower; borrowers are observationally indistinguishable
to all other agents. The number of good borrowers is Ng, and the number of
bad borrowers is Nb, both of which should be thought of as large.
There are a large number of lenders, more than the number of borrowers.
Each lender has one unit of input good in the ﬁrst period. Like borrowers,
lenders only desire to consume in the second period. Unlike borrowers, how-
ever, lenders have linear, risk-neutral utility functions. Their utility is given by
c1+βc2, where c1 is second-period consumption of output and c2 is consump-
tion of a borrower’s collateral good. I assume that the preference parameter
β is positive but strictly less than one. This reﬂects the assumption that a
collateral good is more valuable to a borrower, relative to the payment good,
than it is to any lender. The difference in valuations could represent a special
match between the borrower and the collateral good or the resource costs of
transferring the good.
Lenders have an alternative investment opportunity available to them that
yields ρ units of output in the second period for every unit of input good
invested in the ﬁrst period. Because they only want to consume in the second
period, lenders will want to lend or invest all of their ﬁrst-period input goods.
Because of their alternative investment opportunity, a loan to a borrower will
4 An exception is Boyd and Smith (1993).       
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have to provide at least as much expected utility as ρ. Because there are more
lenders than there are borrowers, there will always be an elastic supply of loans
on terms that provide lenders with at least as much expected utility as ρ.
A loan contract, or contract for short, could in general specify payments of
output and collateral by the borrower for each possible return. In other words,
a contract could consist of four numbers: payments of output and collateral
when the return is high and payments of output and collateral when the return
is low. We can restrict attention to simpler contracts without doing any harm,
however. First, note that the low return is zero, so the payment of output when
the return is low will always be zero. Second, consider the collateral payment
when the return is high. It is easy to show that as long as R is large enough,
it is never desirable to have a positive collateral payment in the good state
since the collateral is more valuable to the borrower than to the lender. More
precisely, any contract with a positive collateral payment in the good state
is dominated by one with no collateral payment and commensurately larger
payment of output in the good state.5 Therefore, we can restrict attention to
contracts that specify two numbers: r, a borrower’s payment of output when
the return is good, and C, a borrower’s payment of collateral when the return
is bad.
Because there are two types of borrowers and they might receive different
contracts, we need a notation for each. Let (rg,Cg) be the contract for a good
borrower, and let (rb,Cb) be the contract for a bad borrower. To be physically
feasible, the output payment must not be greater than the return in the good
state, R, and the collateral payment must be nonnegative and no greater than
the borrower’s collateral, K. I assume that R and K are large enough that these
feasibility constraints never bind. Since they play no role in the analysis, from
here on I will ignore them.
In the second period a borrower can hide the return R, making it appear
that the return is zero. The hidden return can be consumed secretly by the
borrower. This possibility constrains the contracts to which the borrower can
credibly agree. For example, if a contract calls for no collateral payment when
the return is low, but some positive payment r when the return is high, the
borrower will always hide the return, pay nothing, and consume the entire
return R in private; the alternative is to make the payment r and consume
R−r. A collateral payment when the return is low can provide an incentive to
make the required payment when the return is high. In this case the borrower
compares paying r to hiding the return and transferring collateral with value
C.I fC ≥ r, then the borrower has no incentive to hide the return. Therefore,
contracts must satisfy the following.
5 This is true under either of the deﬁnitions of equilibrium that appear below.          
66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Incentive constraints:
rh ≤ Ch for h = g,b. (1)
Condition (1) ensures that the borrower has an incentive to repay the loan
as agreed when the return is high, rather than hand over the collateral. The
incentive constraints imply that loans must be “fully collateralized,” meaning
that the value of the collateral (to the borrower) is at least as large as the value
of the promised repayment. If C > r, the loan is “overcollateralized.” The
only contracts that satisfy the incentive constraint (1) are collateralized debt
contracts—noncontingent except when the return is insufﬁcient to make the
payment r.6
I can now describe the most crucial condition that contracts must satisfy
in this environment. Suppose that the end result of the interactions between
agents in this economy is that good borrowers receive contracts (rg,Cg) and
bad borrowers receive contracts (rb,Cb). Since a borrower’s type is private
information, one type of borrower could conceivably participate pretending
to be the other type of borrower, receiving the contract meant for the other
type. All participants might be expected to be aware of this possibility. If the
designation of contract (rg,Cg) for good borrowers and contract (rb,Cb) for
bad borrowers is to correspond to reality, then it must not be in any borrower’s
interest to masquerade as the other type of borrower. This condition, which
I call the self-selection constraints, must be satisﬁed by the outcome of any
mechanism agents adopt. Stated formally, we have
Self-selection constraints:
pgu[(R − rg) + K] + (1 − pg)u(K − Cg)
≥ pgu[(R − rb) + K] + (1 − pg)u(K − Cb) (2)
pbu[(R − rb) + K] + (1 − pb)u(K − Cb)
≥ pbu[(R − rg) + K] + (1 − pb)u(K − Cg). (3)
Constraint (2) states that the expected utility of a good borrower is at least
as high under contract (rg,Cg) as under contract (rb,Cb). Similarly, constraint
(3) states that the expected utility of a bad borrower is at least as high under
contract (rb,Cb) as under the contract (rg,Cg). Neither type of borrower has an
incentive to pose as the other.
6 The distinction between a risky debt contract and a more general contingent claim is blurred
when there are only two returns. For example, one might just as well call a contract satisfying (1)
a collateralized proﬁt-sharing plan; the borrower promises to pay a fraction r/R of the return or
else hand over collateral when the return is zero. When there are many possible returns, however,
the distinction is quite meaningful.        
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The self-selection constraints are illustrated in Figure 1. The good state
output payment r is measured on the vertical axis, while the bad state collateral
payment C is measured on the horizontal axis. Any arbitrary contract (r,C) can
be represented by a point on the graph. Borrower preferences over contracts
are shown by means of indifference curves. The curve labeled Vg is the set
of contracts that leaves a good borrower indifferent to the contract (rg,Cg).
Similarly, the curve labeled Vb is the set of contracts that leaves a bad borrower
indifferent to the contract (rb,Cb).
Borrowers would like smaller payments in either state, so indifference
curves slope down and borrower utility is increasing toward the lower left
corner of the graph. A contract like (ˆ r, ˆ C) is preferred over (rg,Cg) by good
borrowers, since it lies below Vg, and is preferred over (rb,Cb) by bad bor-
rowers, since it lies below Vb. The indifference curves of a bad borrower are
everywhere steeper than the indifference curves of a good borrower. Because
the probability of having to surrender collateral is larger for bad borrowers,













Notes: r is the loan repayment amount, and C is the collateral that is transferred in the event
of default. Vb is a bad-borrower indifference curve through the contract (rb,Cb). Vg is a good-
borrower indifference curve through the contract (rg,Cg). Utility is increasing to the lower left.
Incentive constraints for voluntary repayment of the loan require that contracts lie below the 45◦
line.      
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they are more averse to collateral requirements than are good borrowers. As a
result, it is always possible to ﬁnd a pair of contracts that “separate” the two
types of borrowers, as shown in Figure 1. Bad borrowers prefer their contract
(rb,Cb) to the good borrowers’ contract (rg,Cg), because the latter would place
them on an inferior indifference curve. Similarly, good borrowers prefer their
contract to the bad borrowers’ contract.
The incentive constraints imply that contracts must lie below the 45◦ line;
the collateral payment must be at least as large as the good state payment. If
(1) is not satisﬁed (r > C), then the borrower would hide the return in the good
state and transfer collateral rather than pay more.
Figure 2 shows “break-even lines” for each type of borrower. The line
labeled πg is the set of loans to good borrowers that earn no excess proﬁts
for lenders. (Throughout this article “proﬁts” refers to the expected proﬁts of
lenders.) In other words, πg is the set of contracts that satisfy
pgr + (1 − pg)βC = ρ. (4)
Contracts above πg earn positive proﬁts for lenders and contracts below πg earn
negative proﬁts. The line labeled πb is similarly deﬁned as the set of loans to
bad borrowers that earn no excess proﬁts for lenders.
pbr + (1 − pb)βC = ρ. (5)
The break-even line for bad borrowers is steeper than the break-even line for
good borrowers because the probability of default and collateral transfer is
larger for bad borrowers. Contracts above πg but below πb (to the left of their
intersection) earn excess proﬁts on good borrowers but negative proﬁts on bad
borrowers. Figure 2 also shows the “pooling break-even line,” πgb. This is the
set of contracts that earn no excess proﬁts when all borrowers apply, satisfying
[pgr + (1 − pg)C]Ng + [pbr + (1 − pb)C]Nb ≥ ρ(Ng + Nb). (6)
Overcollateralization is inefﬁcient in this environment, ceteris paribus. As
Figure 2 shows, a borrower’s indifference curve is always steeper than the
break-even line for that borrower. In the absence of the incentive and self-
selection constraints, a borrower choosing among all of the contracts on the
appropriate break-even line would prefer the one on the vertical axis, where
collateral transfer is zero. There are two reasons for this. First, such a contract
minimizes the risk borne by the borrower. Second, collateral is more valu-
able in the hands of the borrower, so better loan terms are available if the
collateral transfer is minimized. The inefﬁciency of collateral transfer implies
that contracts will attempt to minimize the collateral component, subject to the
incentive and self-selection constraints.      
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Notes: πg (πb) is the set of contracts earning zero expected proﬁts on good (bad) borrowers. πgb
is the set of contracts earning zero expected proﬁts on the average borrower.
2. AN ARGUMENT FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
IN LOAN MARKETS
A Deﬁnition of Equilibrium: The Wilson Equilibrium
I have described an economic environment, in other words, the preferences, en-
dowments and technologies (including information technologies) of an artiﬁcial
economy. An economic model also requires a means of selecting a predicted
outcome from among the many possible outcomes that are feasible for any
given environment—in other words, a deﬁnition of “equilibrium.” The usual   
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candidate is the competitive equilibrium in which agents take prices as given
and select utility- or proﬁt-maximizing quantities.
The standard notion of a competitive equilibrium is problematic in adverse
selection environments, however. In frictionless environments, the value of a
commodity is known to the buyer and so the perceived desirability of a transac-
tion depends only on the preferences of the buyer and the price. In an adverse
selection environment, buyers’ beliefs about the value of the item—a ﬁnancial
claim, in our case—hinge on the actions of sellers, which in turn may depend
on the entire array of options available to sellers. Thus the desirability of a
given transaction may depend on all of the other transactions taking place. In
our environment, for example, a lender’s beliefs about which borrowers have
applied for a loan depend on what other loan contracts are available. Another
lender could offer a contract that takes away the best borrowers, leaving behind
high-risk borrowers.
A number of deﬁnitions of equilibrium have been proposed for adverse
selection economies. Many have deﬁned equilibrium as the outcome of some
game agents are assumed to play. Formally, a game consists of a sequence
of moves and countermoves available to agents, along with a speciﬁcation of
the payoffs they receive for any particular sequence of chosen moves. Players
adopt strategies, functions determining their choice of move in various circum-
stances. The outcome of the game is presumed to be a Nash equilibrium, in
which agents take other agents’ strategies as given and choose a strategy that
maximizes their expected payoff. In a Nash equilibrium, each player’s strategy
is a “best response” to other players’ strategies.
The simplest version of this approach to adverse selection economies is a
two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts,
and in the second stage borrowers choose which contracts to accept. Accepted
contracts are then executed, determining payoffs. A lender decides on a loan
offer, taking as given the loans offered by other lenders and the way in which
borrowers select from the available loans. Unfortunately, as Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) showed in a closely related environment, there often is no equi-
librium for this game. The problem is that “pooling” contracts, in which all
borrowers receive the same contract, are always vulnerable to contracts that
“cream-skim” the best borrowers away, while separating contracts can be vul-
nerable to pooling contracts that make both types of borrowers better off. Thus
in some cases this notion of equilibrium makes no prediction at all!
One alternative that has been proposed is a particular four-stage game. The
ﬁrst two stages are as before, with lenders making offers and borrowers ac-
cepting. In the third stage lenders can withdraw any loan offer made in the ﬁrst
stage, but no contracts can be added. Lenders cannot precommit to not withdraw
a contract in the third stage. In the ﬁnal stage borrowers choose contracts again,
the game ends, and contracts that have been accepted are executed. This game
always has an equilibrium, so it avoids the serious existence problem of the      
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two-stage game. This deﬁnition of equilibrium, which I describe more explicitly
below, was ﬁrst proposed by Charles Wilson in 1977 and is widely known as
the “Wilson equilibrium.” As I will show, there is a rationale for government
loan market intervention in models adopting the Wilson equilibrium.7
Many other deﬁnitions of equilibrium have been proposed for adverse se-
lection environments, and models adopting some of them have been used to
justify government intervention in loan markets. The rationale for government
intervention under these other equilibria is similar to that of the Wilson equi-
librium, and I will brieﬂy comment on them at the end of this section. One
advantage of the Wilson equilibrium is that it always exists.
To formally deﬁne a Wilson equilibrium, let S be a set of contracts. The
set S could be a pair of separating contracts or a single pooling contract.
Deﬁnition (defeats): Given a set of contracts S and another set of contracts S ,
suppose borrowers self-select among both sets of contracts. If any contracts in
S earn negative proﬁts, delete the smallest number of contracts in S such that
the remaining contracts are all proﬁtable after borrowers again self-select. If all
of the contracts in S  now earn nonnegative proﬁts and at least one earns strictly
positive proﬁts, then the set of contracts S  defeats the set of contracts S.8
Deﬁnition: A Wilson Equilibrium is a set of contracts S satisfying the following
conditions:
(i) the incentive constraints (1);
(ii) the self-selection constraints (2) and (3);
(iii) each contract earns nonnegative proﬁts for lenders; and
(iv) no other set of contracts S  exists that defeats the set of contracts S.
The ﬁrst two conditions require that contracts be consistent with the infor-
mational imperfections of the environment. Condition (iii) states that each
individual contract must at least break even. The essential idea in condition (iv)
is that a set of equilibrium contracts cannot be trumped by some other contracts
earning excess proﬁts. The critical component of the deﬁnition concerns the
conjectures of lenders contemplating introducing the deviating contracts. A new
contract might attract good borrowers from other lenders and might earn excess
proﬁts, but some of the original contracts may then earn negative proﬁts. If the
7 Innes (1991) describes the case for government intervention in loan markets based on
the Wilson equilibrium. Crocker and Snow (1985a) prove the existence of Pareto-improving
government tax schemes in the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model.
8 This deﬁnition, following Wilson, does not rely on an explicit formal deﬁnition of a game.
Wilson viewed these conditions as deﬁning a competitive equilibrium. As is typical, the game has
multiple equilibria. One could view the deﬁnition as selecting a particularly plausible equilibrium.
Hellwig (1987) conjectures that recently proposed equilibrium “reﬁnements” select the Wilson
equilibrium.        
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original contracts now earning negative proﬁts are withdrawn, borrowers will
reallocate themselves among the remaining contracts and some new contracts
may now earn negative proﬁts. Such contracts do not defeat the equilibrium.
If the new contracts remain proﬁtable, then they have defeated the original set
of contracts, which could not have been an equilibrium.
Condition (iii) is crucial. It is sometimes called the “type-wise break-even”
condition, since it requires that each contract earn nonnegative proﬁts on its
own. This condition is derived from the ability of lenders to withdraw any
unproﬁtable contracts at the third stage of the game. Furthermore, lenders can-
not precommit to not withdraw unproﬁtable contracts. As we will see below,
condition (iii) implies a welfare-enhancing role for government intervention.
What Does the Wilson Equilibrium Look Like?
There is a unique set of contracts that constitutes a Wilson equilibrium. De-
pending on parameter values, the Wilson equilibrium is one of two types.9
One type, the separating equilibrium, is shown in Figure 3. The bad borrower
receives the contract (r∗
b,C∗
b), where the bad-type break-even line, πb, intersects
the 45◦ line. Of all the contracts that break even on bad borrowers and satisfy
the incentive constraint (1), the contract (r∗
b,C∗
b) is the one most preferred by
bad borrowers. The good borrower’s contract has to lie on or above V∗
b, the
bad borrower’s indifference curve through (r∗
b,C∗
b), in order to satisfy the self-
selection constraint (3). Since it must at least break even, it must also lie on
or above πg. Of all the contracts satisfying (3) and the good-type break-even
condition, the contract (r∗
g,C∗
g) is the one most preferred by good borrowers.
It is easy to see why this is an equilibrium. First, imagine trying to attract
good borrowers without attracting the bad borrowers. To do so the new contract
would have to lie below the good-type indifference curve V∗
g but above V∗
b,t o
the southeast of (r∗
g,C∗
g) in Figure 3. But such contracts earn negative proﬁts
since they lie below πg. Similarly, there is no contract that attracts only the
bad borrowers, satisﬁes the incentive constraint, and earns nonnegative proﬁts.
Finally, imagine introducing a pooling contract that attracts both good and
bad borrowers. Such a contract would have to lie on or above the pooling
break-even line, πgb. No such contract would succeed in attracting the good
borrowers, since πgb lies everywhere above V∗
g.10
The other type of Wilson equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium. Both types
of borrowers receive the same loan contract, (r∗∗,C∗∗) in Figure 4. This contract
lies at the tangency of the pooling break-even line, πgb, and a good borrower’s
9 There is a knife-edge case of a single set of parameter values for which both types of
equilibria coexist, which I will ignore.
10 In this case the Wilson equilibrium is the same as the equilibrium of the two-stage game
analyzed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).            
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Notes: Bad borrowers receive the contract (r∗
b,C∗
b), where the bad-borrower break-even line, πb,
intersects the 45◦ line. Good borrowers receive the contract (r∗
g,C∗
g), where the good-borrower
break-even line intersects the bad borrower’s indifference curve through (r∗
b,C∗
b); the bad borrower




g). Good borrowers prefer (r∗
g,C∗
g) to any contract on
the pooling break-even line, πgb. This type of equilibrium occurs for high and very high levels
of Nb/Ng in Table 1.
indifference curve, V∗
g. This contract provides higher expected utility for a good
borrower than the separating equilibrium, since it lies below the indifference
curve through the separating allocation, V∗
g. Of all of the pooling contracts,
(r∗∗,C∗∗) is most preferred by the good borrowers.11
To see why this is an equilibrium, consider how a lender might try to at-
tract good borrowers by offering a contract like (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg) in Figure 4. This would
indeed attract good borrowers and it would make positive proﬁts as well, since
it lies above the good-type break-even line, πg. But now the contract (r∗∗,C∗∗)
would lose money, since it would only be selected by bad borrowers. It would
11 Note that the pooling equilibrium might lie on the 45◦ line. This occurs if there is no
point below the 45◦ line on πgb tangent to a good borrower’s indifference curve.            
74 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly























Notes: The Wilson equilibrium contract (r∗∗,C∗∗) is the pooling contract that maximizes the
expected utility of the good borrower. The rival contract (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg) would attract all of the good
borrowers, but fails to defeat (r∗∗,C∗∗) because the latter would then lose money on just bad
borrowers and be withdrawn, forcing all borrowers to take (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg), which would then lose money.
This type of equilibrium occurs for intermediate, low, and very low levels of Nb/Ng in Table 1.
be withdrawn in the third stage of the game, leaving only the new contract
(ˆ rg, ˆ Cg). The new contract would now attract both types of borrowers, and since
it lies below πgb it would earn negative proﬁts. Such a contract thus fails to
defeat (r∗∗,C∗∗). It should be clear that no other pooling contract is able to
defeat (r∗∗,C∗∗) either, since none would break even and attract just the good
borrowers after (r∗∗,C∗∗) is withdrawn.12
Which equilibrium occurs depends on whether πgb, the pooling break-
even line, intersects V∗
g, the good borrower’s indifference curve that passes
through the good-type separating contract. If it does, the equilibrium is a pooling
12 In this case the Rothschild and Stiglitz equilibrium does not exist because the contract
(ˆ rg, ˆ Cg) would defeat the candidate equilibrium (r∗∗,C∗∗); their equilibrium does not allow sub-
sequent withdrawal of contracts earning negative proﬁts.        
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contract like (r∗∗,C∗∗) in Figure 4. If it does not, the equilibrium is the set of
break-even separating contracts shown in Figure 3. This depends on whether
πgb lies closer to πg or πb, which in turn depends on the ratio Nb/Ng. If there
are many bad borrowers relative to good borrowers, pooling allocations are
unattractive to the good borrower, so the type-wise break-even separating al-
location is the equilibrium. If there are few bad borrowers relative to good
borrowers, then the good borrower does well in a pooling allocation. As Nb/Ng
approaches zero and the bad borrowers become a negligible portion of the
market, the equilibrium allocation approaches the intersection of πg and the
45◦ line, the loan that the good borrower would receive if there were no bad
borrowers.
Is the Wilson Equilibrium Pareto-Optimal?
Are there any alternative allocations that make no agents worse off and make
at least one agent strictly better off? If the answer is no, the given allocation
is Pareto-optimal. The only relevant alternative allocations to check, of course,
are those that are attainable—allocations that respect the resource, incentive,
and self-selection constraints of the environment.
Is the Wilson equilibrium Pareto-optimal? Often the answer is no. Figure 5




b)} is a separating Wil-
son equilibrium, as before. (This occurs when the ratio of bad to good borrowers
is above a certain threshold.) Now replace the bad borrowers’ contract with the
contract (ˆ rb, ˆ Cb), down and to the left along the 45◦ line. This new contract
makes bad borrowers better off, but earns negative proﬁts since it lies below πb.
In order to maintain resource feasibility, the new contract for good borrowers
must earn excess proﬁts. As a result, the good borrowers’ new contract must lie
on or above a line parallel to (but above) πg, shown as a dashed line in Figure 5.
The new contract for bad borrowers relaxes the self-selection constraint, which
now requires that (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg) lie on or above ˆ Vb. Among the contracts that satisfy
the two constraints, the contract (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg), at the intersection of the dashed line
and ˆ Vb, is the one most preferred by good borrowers.
As shown in Figure 5, the good borrowers’ new contract lies on an indif-
ference curve that is superior to V∗
g, the indifference curve through the Wilson
equilibrium contract.13 The new set of contracts makes both types of borrowers
better off, and by construction, lenders receive just as much expected consump-
tion (and therefore expected utility) as before. In addition, the new contracts
have been constructed to satisfy incentive and self-selection constraints. There-
fore, the set of contracts {(ˆ rg, ˆ Cg),(ˆ rb, ˆ Cb)} Pareto-dominates the separating
Wilson equilibrium contracts.
13 The new contract gives the good borrower a consumption pattern that is less risky than
under the original contract. In addition, the good borrower beneﬁts from reduced collateralization.        
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Notes: Bad borrowers prefer the contract (ˆ rb, ˆ Cb) to the equilibrium contract (r∗
b,C∗
b). Because
(ˆ rb, ˆ Cb) lies below πb, the resource feasible contracts for good borrowers now lie along π 
g. The
good borrower can now obtain the contract (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg), where the bad borrower’s indifference curve,
ˆ Vb, intersects π 
g. As shown, (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg) yields greater expected utility than (r∗
g,C∗
g).
The Wilson equilibrium is Pareto-optimal when Nb/Ng is very large. When-
ever Nb/Ng is above some critical threshold, the dashed good-borrower resource
feasibility line lies so far above πg that no improvement for good borrowers is
possible. This might even be true for any possible choice of alternative bad-
borrower contract along the 45◦ line. If Nb/Ng is below the critical threshold
the separating equilibrium is Pareto-dominated.
When the Wilson equilibrium is a pooling contract and does not lie on
the 45◦ line, it is easy to show that it is not Pareto-optimal. The equilibrium
allocation is dominated by a pair of separating contracts lying along V∗∗
b ; the
alternative contract for bad borrowers is above πgb and the contract for good
borrowers is below. Thus bad borrowers are indifferent and good borrowers
are made strictly better off. If the Wilson equilibrium is the 45◦ line pooling
contract, then it is Pareto-optimal. This occurs for values of Nb/Ng below some
threshold. To summarize then, for a range of intermediate values of Nb/Ng the          
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Wilson equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal. For values of Nb/Ng above or below
this range, the Wilson equilibrium is Pareto-optimal.14
Government Intervention Can Be Pareto-Improving
A crucial feature of the alternative allocations that Pareto-dominate the Wilson
equilibrium is that they involve cross-subsidy. A pair of feasible contracts in-
volve cross-subsidy if they do not lie on the individual break-even lines πg and
πb; in other words, one earns positive expected proﬁts while the other earns
negative expected proﬁts. In the allocations that Pareto-dominate the Wilson
equilibrium, the good borrowers subsidize the bad borrowers, loosening the
self-selection constraint and allowing good borrowers a less risky consump-
tion pattern and reduced collateral transfer. Such allocations cannot be Wilson
equilibria because they violate the type-wise break-even condition. When the
Wilson equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal, government intervention can help by
performing the cross-subsidization that is ruled out in equilibrium. Tax and
subsidy schemes can provide bad borrowers with better loan terms, relaxing
the bad borrower’s self-selection constraint and allowing more desirable loan
terms for good borrowers. Good borrowers are better off, even though they
bear the tax burden.
Government intervention in this credit market can take many forms. One
method is a subsidy for high-interest (bad-type) loans. The government could
fund the subsidy through taxes levied on lenders’ returns. This would relax the
bad-borrower break-even line faced by lenders, making them willing to offer
subsidized loan terms. The net tax on loans to good borrowers would shift
upward the good-type break-even line. Tax and subsidy rates can be selected
so that the resulting Wilson equilibrium Pareto-dominates the no-intervention
equilibrium.15
One difﬁculty with a subsidy scheme of this sort is that it must be applied
only to the loan contracts selected in equilibrium by the bad borrowers. A sim-
pler alternative is a government loan guarantee applicable to all loans, funded
by a tax on lenders’ interest income. The government would guarantee a fraction
δ of the stipulated loan repayment r, where β<δ<1. If the collateral transfer
yielded βC <δ r, the government would pay the lender δr − βC. This could
be funded by a tax, τ, on lenders’ net interest earnings, (r−ρ). The parameter
β can be set so that only bad borrowers are subsidized in equilibrium. The
break-even lines for loans to type h borrowers (h = g,b) is now
ph[r − τ(r − ρ)] + (1 − ph)MAX[βC,δr] = ρ. (7)
14 For a complete welfare analysis of the closely related Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance envi-
ronment, see Crocker and Snow (1985b).
15 Crocker and Snow (1985a) consider such tax/subsidy schemes.            
78 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The government budget constraint is
τpg(rg − ρ)Ng + τpb(rb − ρ)Nb ≥ (1 − pg)NgMAX[0,δrg − βCg]
+ (1 − pb)NbMAX[0,δrb − βCb]. (8)
The effect of the tax is to rotate both break-even lines in a clockwise direction
around the point at which they intersect. The effect of the guarantee is to make
the lines ﬂat to the left of where δr = βC. The combined effect is illustrated
in Figure 6.
The allocation {(ˆ rg, ˆ Cg),(ˆ rb, ˆ Cb)} can be attained by setting τ so that
(ˆ rg, ˆ Cg) satisﬁes (7), and then setting δ so that (ˆ rb, ˆ Cb) satisﬁes (7). The feasi-
bility of the new set of contracts implies that the government budget constraint
is satisﬁed.16 In the case of the pooling Wilson equilibrium, parameters could
similarly be set to achieve a Pareto-dominating separating allocation.
Other welfare-enhancing schemes are easy to imagine, but all share the
same principle. The government is able to cross-subsidize loan contracts in a
way that is ruled out in the Wilson equilibrium. Cross-subsidies are inconsistent
with rational strategies in the multi-stage game that agents are assumed to play.
A natural question that arises is: Why would agents play this particular game?
Other Deﬁnitions of Equilibrium
As I mentioned earlier, other deﬁnitions of equilibrium in adverse selection
models have been used to justify government intervention in loan markets.
Some authors select the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium (type-wise break-even
separating contracts) and restrict attention to cases in which it exists (Smith
and Stutzer 1989; Gale 1990). Some authors adopt pooling allocations and note
that such allocations are sometimes Pareto-dominated (Greenwald and Stiglitz
1986; de Meza and Webb 1987; Mankiw 1986). John Riley (1979) proposed an
equilibrium very similar to Wilson’s, in which lenders cannot withdraw con-
tracts in the third stage (as they can under the Wilson setup) but can propose
new contracts if they wish.17
16 This scheme would be affected by the possibility that the new pooling break-even line
may now intersect the good borrower’s indifference curve through (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg). If it did, the Wilson
equilibrium in the presence of this government guarantee is a pooling contract on the 45◦ line. If
the tax and subsidy parameters are set to balance the budget at the separating contracts, they may
violate the budget constraint at the pooling equilibrium. This problem might limit the magnitude
of the Pareto-improvement. Adding a ﬁxed lump-sum component to the tax schedule can get
around the problem. See Crocker and Snow (1985a).
17 A vast literature studies adverse selection environments as “signaling games,” in which
the informed agents (our borrowers) move ﬁrst by taking some irrevocable action or making
a contract offer; see Cho and Kreps (1987). This approach has not yet been applied to policy
analysis.        
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Notes: ˆ πg (ˆ πb) is the set of contracts that break even after taxes when accepted by good (bad)
borrowers. The tax on net interest income rotates the break-even lines, while the guarantee ﬂattens
them out to the left of the line δr = βC, where the guarantee just pays off.
All of these other deﬁnitions of equilibrium impose a particular struc-
ture on the way agents interact, some through explicit games, some in an
ad hoc fashion. All share the feature that “equilibrium” allocations can fail
to be Pareto-optimal, providing a role for government intervention. Under all
deﬁnitions, equilibrium is Pareto-dominated in all the cases in which the Wil-
son equilibrium is Pareto-dominated. Under some deﬁnitions, equilibrium is
Pareto-dominated in other cases as well. In a sense, the Wilson equilibrium
provides the strongest case for government intervention because, of the equilib-
ria that have been proposed, the laissez-faire Wilson equilibrium is least likely
to be Pareto-dominated; if government intervention is warranted for the Wilson
equilibrium, it is warranted under other deﬁnitions as well. In any event, the
Wilson equilibrium is representative of deﬁnitions that give rise to market
failure in adverse selection environments, and my remarks apply with equal
force to all.         
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What About Credit Rationing?
Adverse selection models of credit markets are often associated with the no-
tion of “credit rationing” (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The parameter values I
have assumed for my economy imply that credit rationing never occurs.18 It
should be clear that the adverse selection justiﬁcation of government inter-
vention in loan markets does not depend on the existence of credit rationing
(Smith and Stutzer 1989; Gale 1990). The justiﬁcation relies on the effects of
self-selection constraints, and these perturb equilibrium whether or not credit
rationing occurs.
3. ADVERSE SELECTION MODELS OF FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES19
Financial intermediaries such as banks, pension funds, and insurance companies
surely play an important role in loan markets. And yet standard frictionless
models have little to say about ﬁnancial intermediaries. Either organizations
such as banks or ﬁrms are taken as primitive elements, or they are economi-
cally inessential because equilibrium allocations can be achieved without them.
Financial intermediaries can be viewed as large multilateral arrangements that
arise to overcome the problems of asymmetric information that are absent in the
standard frictionless models. Much recent effort has gone into the search for en-
vironments in which “realistic” multilateral arrangements, or at least aspects of
them, are in some sense endogenous outcomes rather than imposed constraints.
Much of this effort has focused on environments in which information is limited
in some way, either being asymmetrically distributed or costly to obtain.
Adverse selection environments have been the basis for a number of promi-
nent recent models of ﬁnancial intermediation.20 In this section I will describe
a simple model of ﬁnancial intermediaries using the economic environment
laid out in Section 1. In Section 2 I took the same environment, adopted a
particular deﬁnition of equilibrium—the Wilson equilibrium—and showed that
government loan market intervention could be Pareto-improving. In this section
I adopt a different deﬁnition of equilibrium; this is the only difference between
the two models. Under the deﬁnition adopted here, ﬁnancial intermediaries
can emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Furthermore, there is no welfare-
enhancing role for government intervention, since equilibrium allocations turn
out to be Pareto-optimal.
18 Insufﬁcient collateral—a low value of K—often gives rise to borrowing constraints.
19 The results presented in this section are due to joint ongoing work with John Weinberg.
20 See Boyd and Prescott (1986), Boyd, Prescott, and Smith (1988), and Lacker and Wein-
berg (1993). One should add Hajime Miyazaki (1977), who interprets cross-subsidizing wage-
employment contracts as an “internal labor market,” in other words, a ﬁrm. Adverse selection
is not the only possible approach; Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) present models of
endogenous ﬁnancial intermediaries based on costly veriﬁcation and delegated monitoring.       
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Financial Intermediaries Are Inhibited Under the Wilson Equilibrium
One hallmark of ﬁnancial intermediaries is that almost all of their assets and
liabilities are ﬁnancial claims, as opposed to physical assets. Because ﬁnancial
intermediaries hold large portfolios, they do not necessarily need to break even
on each individual claim. In contrast, when individual claims are sold directly
by borrowers to ultimate lenders, equilibrium requires that each claim at least
break even. Cross-subsidization thus appears to be inconsistent with nonin-
termediated lending. Therefore, ﬁnancial intermediaries should be expected to
arise whenever allocations require cross-subsidization. Adverse selection mod-
els of ﬁnancial intermediaries are based on just such reasoning.21
If we want to allow for the possibility of ﬁnancial intermediaries, the
equilibrium notion adopted in the previous section is clearly inadequate. The
Wilson equilibrium assumes that lenders and borrowers can only enter into bi-
lateral ﬁnancial contracts. Multilateral ﬁnancial arrangements are precluded by
assumption. For simplicity, lenders in our environment have only one unit each
to lend, exactly the amount each borrower wants to borrow. Thus no lender
offers more than one contract. It would make no difference for the models,
however, if each lender was large relative to borrowers and made many loans.
More to the point, the Wilson equilibrium imposes a particular game on
the agents in the economy. Agents are assumed to interact through a speciﬁc
sequence of moves and countermoves governed by a speciﬁc set of rules. In
particular, the game underlying the Wilson equilibrium speciﬁes that in the third
stage lenders are able to withdraw individual loan contracts. This prevents a
lender from offering a menu of contracts as a whole in the ﬁrst stage and
precommitting not to drop any single contract. This feature gives rise to the
break-even constraint, which implies a welfare-enhancing role for government
intervention. The same feature rules out the cross-subsidizing allocations asso-
ciated with ﬁnancial intermediaries.
In many instances, participants in real world economies interact within
highly structured institutions, governed by rules, laws, customs, and so forth.
A wide variety of market institutions come to mind, from decentralized search
markets, to trading fairs, to auctions, to highly centralized (and organized)
open-outcry markets. Many of these institutional arrangements can easily be
cast as games since they impose binding restrictions on the interaction of par-
ticipants. Game theory is obviously quite useful for analyzing the implications
of alternative institutional and market structures.
However, when we are interested in predicting institutional arrangements,
when we want a model of which game agents will play, we need a different
21 The situation is analogous to a multiproduct ﬁrm with economies of scope across products.
In a sustainable equilibrium one product might be subsidized in the sense that the price is less
than the stand-alone marginal cost.       
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approach. Indeed, outcomes in adverse selection environments are known to be
particularly sensitive to the assumed “market convention,” as Wilson’s subse-
quent (1979) research demonstrated. He showed that equilibrium can be very
different depending on whether the informed agents (the borrowers in our en-
vironment) or the uninformed agents (the lenders) propose contracts. Wilson’s
1979 results stand as a strong warning about the reliability of predictions from
adverse selection models in which equilibrium is identiﬁed as the outcome of
one particular game.
A Different Deﬁnition of Equilibrium: The Sustainable Equilibrium22
A different deﬁnition of equilibrium is needed then, a different way of selecting
a predicted outcome for this environment, one that allows for the possibility of
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Three ideas guide the deﬁnition described below. First,
I want to be agnostic about the game agents might play to implement the re-
sulting allocation, since imposing a particular game could arbitrarily restrict the
allocations agents can achieve. Second, there should be some notion of compe-
tition between rival ﬁnancial intermediaries. If a ﬁnancial intermediary is part of
an equilibrium, there must be no other rival ﬁnancial intermediary that “beats” it
by doing better for the agents involved. Third, for a rival ﬁnancial intermediary
to beat a candidate intermediary, the rival must be “credible” in the sense that it
cannot be beaten by any other (credible) rival intermediary. If a rival interme-
diary is itself vulnerable to another rival, it cannot be taken seriously as a threat
to overturn the candidate allocation. It is important to note that the credibility
requirement is imposed on any subsequent proposed rival intermediary.
While the deﬁnition of the Wilson equilibrium was stated in terms of con-
tracts, the deﬁnition of the sustainable equilibrium can be stated more clearly in
terms of coalitions and allocations.Acoalition is simply a collection of some
or all of the agents in the economy. Let n designate a typical coalition; n is a
list of the names of each agent in the coalition. Let N designate the coalition
consisting of every agent in the economy, that is, the coalition of the whole.
An allocation for a given coalition is a list of the consumption plans of all
agents in a coalition, together with their investment decisions. An allocation is
equivalent to specifying all of the contracts among agents in a coalition. Let a
designate a typical allocation.
The central ingredient in the deﬁnition of a sustainable equilibrium is
the idea of blocking, which captures the notion of competition between rival
22 The equilibrium described here was introduced in Lacker and Weinberg (1993) and is
related to the idea of “coalition-proof Nash equilibrium” formulated by Bernheim, Peleg, and
Whinston (1987) and Greenberg (1989). Kahn and Mookherjee (1991) independently developed
a closely related equilibrium notion for games in adverse selection environments also based on
the coalition-proof idea, but their approach differs enough in certain details that their results have
a very different ﬂavor.   
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coalitions. Intuitively, an allocation for a given coalition can be blocked by a
subcoalition if the subcoalition can feasibly make all its members at least as
well off and some strictly better off. In an adverse selection environment this
idea must be speciﬁed with some care. A key consideration is that allocations
for a subcoalition are limited by the incentive and self-selection constraints, as
are all allocations. An additional consideration arises, however. If a subcoalition
is proposed, will any of the agents left behind in the original coalition wish to
misrepresent themselves in order to gain entry into the deviating subcoalition?
If so, the self-selection constraints for the subcoalition will be undermined,
making the proposed deviation infeasible. The following deﬁnition of blocking
takes these considerations into account.
Deﬁnition: An allocation a for coalition n is blocked by a subcoalition n ,
together with an allocation a , if:
(i) the blocking allocation a  satisﬁes the incentive and self-selection con-
straints and is resource feasible for n ;
(ii) all agents in n  are at least as well off under a  as they would be under a,
and at least one agent is made strictly better off; and
(iii) no agents that the subcoalition leave behind in the original coalition
could make themselves better off by joining the subcoalition, including
by claiming to be a different type.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are standard. Condition (iii) implies that if one type
of agent is made strictly better off, the coalition attracts all of that type of
agent. Condition (iii) also implies that if a deviating subcoalition wants to
attract some, but not all, of a given type of agent, they must make that type
of agent indifferent between joining the subcoalition (truthfully) and receiving
the original allocation. Also, that type of agent must have no incentive to join
the subcoalition by claiming to be another type of agent in the subcoalition.
Condition (iii) merely extends the self-selection constraints to cover potential
blocking subcoalitions; it recognizes a subcoalition’s vulnerability to strategic
behavior.
I am now ready to deﬁne a sustainable equilibrium. In order to do so
I must deﬁne the sustainable allocations for each possible subcoalition, as
well as for the coalition of the whole. The sustainable equilibrium is then just
the sustainable allocation for the coalition of the whole. Let s(n) denote the
set of sustainable allocations for coalition n. The deﬁnition is then simple:
an allocation is sustainable if it is not blocked by any subcoalition together
with a sustainable allocation for that subcoalition. The mapping s(n) is deﬁned
formally as follows.
Deﬁnition: The mapping s(n) is the set of sustainable allocations for each
coalition n if it satisﬁes the following properties:           
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(i) allocations a in s(n) satisfy the incentive and self-selection constraints
and are resource feasible for the coalition n and
(ii) an allocation a is in s(n) if and only if there does not exist a subcoalition
n  together with an allocation a  in s(n ) such that (a ,n ) blocks a.
Condition (i) merely states that sustainable allocations must satisfy resource
and informational constraints. Condition (ii) captures the notion of credibility.
An allocation is sustainable if it is not blocked by any subcoalition together
with an allocation that is sustainable for that subcoalition. If an allocation is
blocked by such a subcoalition and allocation, then it is not sustainable.
A sustainable equilibrium, then, is any allocation that is sustainable for the
population as a whole.23
What Does the Sustainable Equilibrium Look Like?
It turns out that there is a simple way to ﬁnd the sustainable equilibrium for
our economy. Solutions to a particular maximization problem, shown below,
are sustainable allocations.
The Miyazaki Problem:
MAX pgu(R − rg + K) + (1 − pg)u(K − Cg)
s. t. pbu(R − rb + K) + (1 − pb)u(K − Cb)
≥ pbu(R − rg + K) + (1 − pb)u(K − Cg) (10)
[pgrg + (1 − pg)βCg]Ng + [pbrb + (1 − pb)βCb]Nb ≥ ρ(Ng + Nb)( 1 1 )
rh ≤ Ch h = g,b (12)
pbu(R − rb + K) + (1 − pb)u(K − Cb) ≥ V 0
b, (13)
23 The sustainable equilibrium is closely related to the core—the set of allocations that are
simply unblocked. The core is empty in the cases in which the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium
does not exist—that is, the cases in which the Wilson equilibrium is a pooling allocation. It
should be clear that the set of sustainable equilibria always contains the set of core allocations,
when they exist, because the latter allows “easier” blocking. Townsend (1978) studies the core in
a perfect information economy with ﬁxed costs of bilateral exchange. There, intermediaries are
required to overcome the nonconvexity. Interestingly, he describes a noncooperative game that
allows contract proposals to include multilateral ﬁnancial arrangements. The equilibrium of the
noncooperative game attains the core allocation, thus bridging the gap between the game-theoretic
and cooperative approaches. Boyd and Prescott (1986), Boyd, Prescott, and Smith (1988), and
Marimon (1988) also study core-like equilibria in adverse selection environments. Given the
deﬁnition of blocking, the core is the set of unblocked allocations. Unfortunately, the core is
often empty in our economy, as it is in many adverse selection economies.       
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where
V 0
b ≡ MAX pbu(R − rb + K) + (1 − pb)u(K − Cb)
s. t. pbrb + (1 − pb)βCb ≥ ρ
rb ≤ Cb.
The Miyazaki Problem maximizes the expected utility of the good borrowers.
The ﬁrst constraint (10) states that bad borrowers have no incentive to pretend
to be good borrowers. The second constraint (11) is just resource feasibility.
The third constraint (12) ensures repayment incentives. The fourth constraint
(13) states that the bad borrowers receive no less expected utility than V 0
b,
the expected utility they would receive if they were on their own. V 0
b is the
maximum expected utility for bad borrowers under a contract that breaks even
and respects the incentive constraint. It should be apparent that V 0
b is equal
to V∗
b, the expected utility under the Wilson equilibrium separating contract,
(r∗
b,C∗
b) in Figure 3.
Hajime Miyazaki, in a 1977 paper in the Bell Journal of Economics, pro-
posed that equilibrium be deﬁned as solutions to an analogous problem in an
adverse selection labor market economy. He argued that employers (analogous
to lenders in our economy) are able to offer cross-subsidized wage-employment
schedules, a situation he identiﬁed as an “internal labor market”—in other
words, a multilateral ﬁnancial arrangement. The “Miyazaki equilibrium,” as it
has come to be called, has been neglected in the adverse selection literature
because cross-subsidization seemed hard to reconcile with a narrow conception
of competitive behavior.
Using a few key properties of the sustainable equilibrium, there is a simple
procedure that ﬁnds it. One important property is that bad borrowers receive
contracts on the 45◦ line, minimizing the risk they bear and the collateral they
transfer. Any other contract providing the same expected utility for the bad
borrowers would use more resources and would thus make good borrowers
worse off.
The ﬁrst step in the procedure to ﬁnd a sustainable equilibrium is to trace
out the set of contracts that are feasible for the good borrower, shown as a
dashed line in Figure 7. This set is constructed by varying the bad borrower’s
contract along the 45◦ degree line between (r∗
b,C∗
b), the separating Wilson
equilibrium contract, and (¯ r, ¯ C), the pooling contract on the 45◦ line. Start by
taking the contract (r∗
b,C∗
b) for the bad borrower as given. Then the best possible
contract for the good borrower is (r∗
g,C∗
g), where both the self-selection and
the resource constraints bind. Now consider the contract (r1
b,C1
b) for the bad





lies below πb, the overall resource constraint is tightened; now contracts along
π1
g are feasible for the good borrower. Because the bad borrower’s self-selection          
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the construction of the dashed line—the set of the best feasible contracts
for the good borrower. Each point on the dashed line corresponds to a particular bad-borrower
contract along the 45◦ line. For the bad-borrower contract (r1
b,C1
b), the best contract for the good
borrower is (r1
g,C1
g), where the bad-borrower indifference curve V1
b intersects the break-even line
π1
g. Similarly, for bad-borrower contract (r2
b,C2




constraint is relaxed, the best possible contract for the good borrower is now
(r1
g,C1
g), up and to the left of (r∗
g,C∗
g). Continuing this procedure for every bad-
borrower contract between (r∗
b,C∗
b) and (¯ r, ¯ C) traces out the dashed line, the set
of the best possible good-borrower contracts for various levels of bad-borrower
utility.
The second step is to select the contract along the dashed locus that max-
imizes the good borrower’s expected utility; the associated allocation is the
sustainable equilibrium. The best contract for the good borrower is shown as
(rs
g,Cs
g) in Figure 8, where the dashed locus is tangent to a good-borrower
indifference curve. The bad borrower receives (rs
b,Cs
b). Depending on the ratio
of bad borrowers to good borrowers, the sustainable equilibrium could instead
be at either of the endpoints of the dashed line. If the ratio of bad borrowers
to good borrowers is relatively large (the range labeled “very high” in Table
1), the dashed line is very steep and the sustainable equilibrium is the set of        
J. M. Lacker: Adverse Selection in Loan Markets 87


































Notes: The contract along the dashed line that maximizes the expected utility of the good borrower
is the sustainable equilibrium: (rs
g,Cs
g). The associated contract for the bad borrower is (rs
b,Cs
b).
The contract (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg) for the good borrowers fails to credibly block the sustainable equilibrium
because it in turn is credibly blocked by (¯ rg, ¯ Cg), the sustainable allocation for the coalition of
just good borrowers.
break-even separating contracts, the same as the Wilson separating equilibrium.
This case is shown in Figure 9. If there are few bad borrowers (the range labeled
“very low” in Table 1), the dashed line is relatively ﬂat and the pooling contract
on the 45◦ line is the sustainable equilibrium, the contract (¯ r, ¯ C) in Figure 10.
Table 1 summarizes the different types of sustainable equilibria for various
values of the ratio of bad borrowers to good.
What prevents lenders from skimming off the good borrowers, offering
a contract they prefer and which earns excess proﬁts (a contract like [ˆ rg, ˆ Cg]
in Figure 8)? Such a deviation lacks credibility because it does not meet the
sustainability requirement deﬁned above. If such a coalition were to form, it
would consist entirely of good borrowers, but it would be vulnerable to the
sustainable allocation for that coalition—the contract (¯ rg, ¯ Cg) at the intersec-
tion of the good-type break-even line, πg, and the 45◦ line. In other words,
agents would anticipate that if the proposed deviation (ˆ rg, ˆ Cg) were to occur,
it would itself be blocked by a subcoalition proposing (¯ rg, ¯ Cg). Since the latter is          
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Notes: When Nb/Ng is very high, the dashed line is steep and the best contract for the good bor-
rower lies at the lower endpoint. In this case, sustainable equilibrium is identical to the separating
Wilson equilibrium and is Pareto-optimal, and ﬁnancial intermediaries are unnecessary.
sustainable, that threat is credible and succeeds in blocking the cream-skimming
deviation. There is no sustainable allocation that attracts the good borrowers
away from the equilibrium contract (rs
g,Cs
g). Attracting just the bad borrowers
is unsuccessful, since any contract that they alone prefer earns negative prof-
its. Finally, there is no pooling contract that would succeed in attracting the
good borrowers, since every feasible pooling allocation gives them utility lower
than Vs
g.
Government Intervention Is Never Pareto-Improving
The sustainable equilibrium is always Pareto-optimal. The Miyazaki Problem
maximizes the expected utility of the good borrowers subject to resource, in-
centive, and self-selection constraints, and a participation constraint for the bad
borrowers. No other feasible allocation yields higher expected utility for good
borrowers without violating the bad borrower’s participation constraint. The
sustainable equilibrium is not necessarily the best possible allocation for the

















































Table 1 Properties of Equilibria as Nb/Ng Varies
Ratio of Bad to Good Borrowers, Nb/Ng
Very Low Low Intermediate High Very High
Wilson equilibrium pooling, pooling, pooling, separating, separating,
45◦ line 45◦ line below 45◦ break-even, break-even,
line, Fig. 4 Fig. 3 Fig. 3
Is the Wilson equilibrium Pareto-optimal? yes yes no no yes
Can government intervention no no yes yes no
be Pareto-improving?
Sustainable equilibrium pooling, separating, cross-subsidizing, separating,
45◦ line, Fig. 8 break-even,
Fig. 10 Fig. 9
Is the sustainable equilibrium Pareto-optimal? yes yes yes
Are ﬁnancial intermediaries necessary? no yes no        
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utility for the bad borrower must provide lower expected utility for the good
borrower.24
Government intervention in whatever form it takes must respect the re-
source, incentive, and self-selection constraints of the environment. Since the
sustainable equilibrium is Pareto-optimal with respect to those constraints, there
are no allocations that the government can feasibly achieve that Pareto-dominate
the sustainable equilibrium. In contrast, sometimes Wilson equilibrium allo-
cations are not Pareto-optimal with respect to resource, incentive, and self-
selection constraints; in exactly these cases government intervention can make
all agents better off (see Table 1).
When Do Financial Intermediaries Arise?
In some cases the sustainable equilibrium involves cross-subsidization across
contracts. This occurs whenever the sustainable equilibrium is a pair of distinct
contracts that do not lie on the individual break-even lines, πg and πb.I n
these cases the sustainable equilibrium is somewhere along the dashed line,
as in Figure 8. When the ratio of bad to good borrowers is very high, the
sustainable equilibrium is a pair of contracts that each break even, as in Figure
9; no cross-subsidization occurs in this case. When the ratio of bad to good
borrowers is very low, as in Figure 10, the sustainable equilibrium is a single
pooling contract and so cross-subsidization occurs.
Financial intermediaries are required whenever the sustainable equilibrium
involves cross-subsidy across contracts. In this case a ﬁnancial intermediary can
break even on a portfolio of loans to both good and bad borrowers even though
individual contracts do not break even; the bad contract earns positive expected
proﬁts while the good contract earns negative expected proﬁts. Direct lending,
with each investor making a single loan, is inconsistent with cross-subsidized
contracts, since no lender would make a single loan earning negative proﬁts.
The allocation that can be achieved by direct bilateral lending, the Wilson
equilibrium, cannot be a sustainable equilibrium in this case because it can
be blocked by a ﬁnancial intermediary offering contracts preferred by both
borrowers.
For extreme values of the ratio of bad to good borrowers, ﬁnancial interme-
diaries are not necessary to achieve the sustainable equilibrium. When the ratio
is very high, each contract breaks even in the sustainable allocation. Individual
lenders know they will break even on the borrowers that request the loans they
offer. When the ratio of bad to good borrowers is very low, lenders offering the
24 All of the allocations corresponding to contracts along the dashed line between the sus-
tainable equilibrium and the pooling contract on the 45◦ line are Pareto-optimal. For a very high
ratio of bad borrowers to good borrowers, as in Figure 9, all of the dashed line corresponds to
Pareto-optimal allocations. For a very low ratio of bad borrowers to good borrowers, as in Figure
10, only the pooling contract on the 45◦ line is Pareto-optimal.           
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Notes: When Nb/Ng is very low, the dashed line is relatively ﬂat and the best contract for the good
borrower is at the upper endpoint; both borrowers receive the contract (¯ r, ¯ C). In this case, the
sustainable equilibrium is identical to the Wilson equilibrium and is Pareto-optimal, and ﬁnancial
intermediaries are unnecessary.
pooling contract make excess proﬁts on good borrowers and negative proﬁts
on bad borrowers. Lenders do not know which type of borrower accepts their
loan, but if they believe that the probability that a given borrower is of a given
type is the same as that type’s representation in the population, then ex ante
expected proﬁts are zero.25
Financial intermediaries arise in all cases in which the Wilson equilibrium
is not Pareto-optimal. This occurs for ranges of the ratio of bad to good borrow-
ers labeled “intermediate” and “high” in Table 1. In these situations the Wilson
equilibrium can be improved upon by government intervention. For the same
reason government intervention is Pareto-improving, the Wilson equilibrium
allocation is unsustainable because it is vulnerable to a ﬁnancial intermediary
offering a Pareto-improving set of contracts. Thus whenever the Wilson equi-
librium suggests a role for government intervention, the sustainable equilibrium
25 Note that ﬁnancial intermediaries could be operative in this equilibrium, but they are not
required.    
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suggests a role for ﬁnancial intermediaries and no role for government inter-
vention. The welfare-enhancing role of government intervention in the Wilson
equilibrium is the direct result of restrictions that prevent the emergence of
ﬁnancial intermediaries.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article I examined a single economy under two different deﬁnitions of
equilibrium. The Wilson equilibrium assumes that agents interact by playing a
speciﬁc four-stage game. Equilibrium allocations are often not Pareto-optimal
under this deﬁnition of equilibrium, and a government tax/subsidy scheme can
be Pareto-improving. Under the other equilibrium, agents are free to commu-
nicate and propose alternative arrangements, and outcomes are required to be
sustainable in a certain sense. The sustainable equilibrium is Pareto-optimal and
implies no welfare-enhancing role for government intervention. The sustain-
able equilibrium also gives rise to ﬁnancial intermediaries, a widely observed
phenomenon in loan markets. By contrast, conditions implicit in the Wilson
equilibrium prevent intermediaries from playing any role. This observation
suggests that the Wilson equilibrium, and others like it, are too restrictive and
that models based on them are unreliable guides to policy. Thus, on the basis of
these considerations, I conclude that adverse selection does not justify govern-
ment intervention in loan markets. Intervention could, of course, be desirable
on redistributive grounds.
One might wonder if the approach advocated here is somehow rigged
to minimize the potential efﬁciency role of the government. The notion of
sustainability places only minimal restrictions on agents’ interactions. Does
this approach give private agents an unrealistic capacity to coordinate their
activities to achieve the best of all possible allocations? Are these assumptions
Panglossian?
This is a legitimate question to raise. To put the question another way,
Under what conditions would such an approach ever predict that government
intervention is welfare-improving? One response is to give the models a nor-
mative rather than positive interpretation. In other words, treat the model as if
it were telling us the best allocation. If we are conﬁdent the primitive assump-
tions on preferences, endowments, and technologies match well with the actual
economy and we observe that the recommended allocation is not being attained,
then government intervention to achieve the optimal allocation is warranted.
The difﬁculty with this approach, however, is that without a positive model
of why the observed allocation falls short of the one recommended by the
economist, we can have little conﬁdence that we have accurately identiﬁed all
of the relevant impediments to trade. Without such conﬁdence, we are forced
to rely on ignorance or irrationality to explain out-of-equilibrium observations.    
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An alternative response is to view government intervention as a potential
outcome, an endogenous component of the equilibrium multilateral arrange-
ment. Indeed, in many models it is hard to distinguish between endogenous
ﬁnancial intermediaries and government-mandated reallocations. A rationale
for government intervention would require a model in which government ac-
tions and private contracts are clearly distinguishable, perhaps in the methods of
enforcing contracts. A case for government intervention could then be made if a
plausible model predicted allocations that could not be achieved through private
arrangements alone, but instead required identiﬁably governmental arrange-
ments. I know of no such model at the present time that justiﬁes government
intervention in loan markets.
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